And no, it's not going to be fixed by firing the two top guys, Michael Wynne and Michael Mosely, for failing to be properly attentive to the disposition and storage of our nuclear arsenal. Indeed, the response, getting rid of personnel, may well be symptomatic of the real problem--an increasing reliance on machines and electronics in preference to people on the ground.

Perhaps another report that came out on the day of the firings provides a clue. The executive summary of what caused the destruction of one of our twenty-one stealth bombers isn't very long, so I'm going to share the whole thing.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION B-2A, T/N 89-0127

ANDERSEN AIR FORCE BASE, GUAM

23 FEBRUARY 2008

On 23 February 2008, at 1030 hrs local (0030 hrs Zulu), a B-2A, T/N 89--0127, assigned to the 509th Bomb Wing, Whiteman Air Force Base (AFB), Missouri crashed during initial takeoff from Anderson AFB, Guam. The Mishap Mission was a scheduled return from Anderson AFB to Whiteman AFB concluding a 4-month continuous bomber presence deployment. The Mishap Aircraft (MA) was number two on takeoff behind the lead aircraft, using standard one-minute formation spacing between bomber aircraft. The two-person crew consisting of Mishap Pilot 1 (MP1) and Mishap Pilot 2 (MP2) successfully ejected from the aircraft during the mishap. MP1 sustained minor injuries, was treated locally and then released. MP2 suffered a spinal compression fracture and was treated at Tripler Army Medical Center in Hawaii before returning to Whiteman AFB. He is expected to reach full recovery. The MA was destroyed at a total loss of $1, 407,006,920. Andersen AFB addressed environmental remediation associated with the mishap.

Almost a billion and a half dollars went up in smoke. But, that was a sunk cost, money that had already been spent to build and maintain this prima-donna of a plane. What's worrisome to me is that little phrase "addressed environmental remediation." What's that supposed to mean? Does it mean that the local Air Force contingent cleaned up the remains and properly disposed of whatever hazardous materials were dispersed on land and in the water, or did they merely promise to write up a report? Surely the Air Force Base as a whole didn't take charge.

In other words, the report doesn't make clear who's doing or done what--much the same problem as what happened with the wandering nukes and the triggers that traveled to Taiwan.

The Board President found, through clear and convincing evidence, that distorted data introduced into the MA flight control computers caused an uncommanded, 30 degree nose-high pitch-up on takeoff resulting in a stall and subsequent crash.

Again, there's no indication who "distorted" and "introduced" the data to the computers. Moreover, it seems that the Board President, presumably a person (who's not introduced to the readers of the report), has conflated the consequence of a series of events with its cause.

Moisture in the MA port transducer units (PTUs) during an air data calibration caused an unnecesarily large "bias" or correction to the air data system. Using this "moisture distorted" data, the MA flight computers calculated inaccurate airspeed and a negative angle of attack (AOA) which contributed to an early rotation and uncommanded pitch-up on takeoff. Loss of all air data resulted in degraded flight controls response and stability of the MA.

So that's the culprit. Moisture. Something not entirely unexpected, considering that Guam is an island in the middle of the Pacific Ocean. And we all know that electricity and water, especially salt water, don't get along very well. Which, I guess, accounts for the air conditioned quarters that are called for when the stealth aircraft aren't actually flying. For, while, according to the National Journal,

The Navy decided it could no longer wait for the development of stealth airplanes, with their ungainly radar-diffusing shapes, which made them difficult to land on aircraft carriers, and their radar-absorbent coatings, which made them difficult

the Air Force

... by contrast, bet all of its chips on stealth. Disappointed by the handling and maintenance problems of its F-117 stealth fighter and B-2 stealth bomber, the service invested heavily in a "third generation" of stealth that would combine radar-evasion with high-agility aerodynamics, supersonic speed, and manageable maintenance. While it poured ever more billions of dollars into this Holy Grail fighter, the F-22 Raptor,...

Anyway, in this instance, the introduction of moisture (by persons or mechanisms unknown) had some disasterous consequences:

The nose-high attitude and heavy gross weight of the MA resulted in deterioration of airspeed. The end result was a low-altitude stall, culminating in a roll and yaw to the left. The lack of airspeed and altitude denied MP1 the ability to recover the MA. As the left wing made contact with the ground, the Mishap Crew successfully ejected. The MA impacted the ground and was destroyed by fire.

Long story short, the pilots we hired and trained to fly this plane were unable to do so when the electronic systems failed as a result of getting wet. Is that maybe a design flaw? There's no hint of that in the conclusion.

Moisture in the PTUs, inaccurate airspeed, a negative AOA calculation and low altitude/low airspeed are substantially contributing factors in this mishap. Another substantially contributing factor was the ineffective communication of critical information regarding a suggested technique of turning on pitot (sic) heat in order to remove moisture prior to performing an air data calibration.

What's an "inaccurate airspeed?" Never mind. Since low altitude and low airspeed would seem to be normal during any take-off or landing, it's unlikely that the crash would have been avoided in their absence. "ineffective communication," on the other hand, I can credit. After all, we've got an example right here in this report. But, I can't for the life of me figure out how warming up the pitot before starting the computer to do its calculations is going to insure that neither moisture nor temperature nor dust particles gum up the electronics.

Everybody knows that humans are fallible and sometimes inattentive, but the idea that electronics are going to do it better needs to be reconsidered.

There was a time when the former Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, seemed to recognize that what had been missing in the decade leading up to attacks of 9/11 was human intelligence, leaving his audience with the impression that was going to be fixed. But now we have a Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, who's all gung-ho about turning the security of our Air Force bases in Iraq over to surveillance by unmanned drones, whose pilots/drivers are expected to monitor, albeit in air-conditioned comfort in Kuwait, Qatar or Colorado, the streaming video for fourteen hours at a time and then, when they see someone suspicious, dispatch a hellfire missile or bomb to get rid of the problem.

But, when Secretary Gates complains that the deployment of more drones to take the place of combat troops has been "like pulling teeth," it seems rather obvious that he's failed to consider that the time-lag or a moment of inattention between the receipt of a video image and the dispatching of a bomb might well result in multiple mishaps on the ground, generating even more resentment in the Iraqi people whose liberty he has thereby curtailed.

When this "assassination by remote control" first started, the Air Force went to some trouble to validate, with information from forces on the ground, that a strike was justified and insisted that qualified pilots manning the monitors make the call to insure the destruction was consistent with the laws of war. That the ultimate goal was to automate security for the bases with a fleet of robot drones (destined to soar through the air up to 29000 feet without a by-your-leave to the government of Iraq, according to the draft status of forces agreement), leaving the people factor out, probably didn't register right away. But, when it did, they balked, probably because killing people by remote control from thousands of miles away is hard to define as a defensive act of war.

But, there's no question that drones are entirely consistent with the belief that not knowing who's doing what to whom is to be preferred. And that's the problem.