June 21, 2007, By Nancy Tobi

Centralizing the power to control votes and determine who holds the reins to our country is more a form of national socialism than democracy.

If you find this language inflammatory, well, you should.

When the Help America Vote Act was passed in 2002, an alien creature was introduced into our historical structure of governing through checks and balances and dispersed power.

The Holt Bill (HR 811) further strengthens and empowers this alien Commission in our governmental structure.

I am concerned with defending my state and its beautiful, long time traditions and culture of grassroots democracy, and my nation's dreams and ideals for democracy and freedom.

This dream depends on our ability to choose the people we want to lead us, and to ensure -- through free and open democratic elections -- that, in fact, it is the people's choice who are the given the power to do so. This is the beauty of the vision of our revolutionary founders, who understood the necessity of dispersed power to check and balance the human inclinations that may arise when people are handed control over the destiny of others.

The Commission, four white house appointees, controls the way America votes and how our votes will be counted.

It does this through a benign and bureaucratic sounding program called the "Voluntary Voting System Guidelines" program. Called "voluntary", because the Constitution does not allow the Executive Branch to mandate the manner in which States administer elections, in reality, The Program is not voluntary at all.

The Commission's Program is not voluntary because it is the means by which The Commission designs the technology and the implementation of all voting systems, computer-based or paper ballot-based, used in the United States of America. Its standards will be the basis for which a limitless number of lawsuits can be brought under a private right of action, lawsuits that can destabilize our nation by throwing elections to the courts and out of the hands of we the people.

Wielding a 2-3 inch binder of software and procedural specifications, requirements, and recommendations, The Commission dictates which technology-based voting equipment will be produced for American voting jurisdictions, as well as the design and procedures for using paper ballot voting systems.

And HR 811, the Holt Bill, enhances, broadens, and indefinitely funds The Commission.

The American people need to think very carefully about the implications of continuing to empower and fund indefinitely The Commission.

The cavalier manner in which many people dismiss the implications of the white house designing our voting machines and controlling paper ballot voting systems -- virtually controlling how every vote in the nation is not only cast but is counted -- is quite dangerous.

Perhaps it is hard for us to envision this alien invasion into our cherished form of democratic governance in the United States of America. Perhaps it is just too much for us to assimilate into our notions of American dreams and ideologies.

Perhaps this was the case for our fellow freedom loving people in Europe in the 1920's and 30's too.

Were people then afraid to use inflammatory language? Afraid to speak about the implications of what their governments were doing, even as they saw those things being carried out in a very systematic and methodical manner?

What did those observers who studied it do, these citizens who sat in nice, clean bureaucratic meetings where IBM vendors worked out the details of their governmental contract for a citizen identification and tracking program, which would enable the government to easily find citizens of various characteristics and ethnicities when deemed necessary?

Were there public observers at the bureaucrats' meetings where the gas ovens were designed, (which kind of vent should we use, what motor power do we need to push the gas through the vents)?

What did these freedom loving citizens do as they observed the meetings, as they began to process the information, to understand what their eyes saw, what their hearts understood?

Were they afraid to tell people, were they afraid to use inflammatory language?

Well, I have sat in our American bureaucrats' meetings, and while they are not designing gas ovens, I have watched them design the death of our democracy.

I have felt the physical impact like a sucker punch to the stomach, the impact of being a freedom loving citizen witnessing these proceedings, as I began to comprehend with clarity and finality what REALLY is going on.

The power of the people's vote, the free, fair, democratic vote, being neutralized and subverted before my very eyes.

Nazi Germany: Law after law enacted to carefully put into place and facilitate the vision of the very legal national socialist government. That national socialist government, which our freedom loving country ultimately rose up to fight against.

Who will save America if we allow ourselves to fall down?

HOLT BILL STATUS JUNE 20, 2007

In today's version of the bill, not only is trade secrecy federalized into law, but the bill forces public servants to sign nondisclosure agreements with corporate vendors, effectively placing gag orders on the very election officials entrusted with our publicly held elections and sealing secret vote counting for the United States of America as federal law!

And who controls this secret vote counting?

The Commission.

The current version of the bill removes the explicit header to extend authorization of The Commission, but nonetheless does in fact broadens its powers and indefinitely extend its authorization and appropriations to support these four white house appointees who control our voting systems.

The Commission is provided various authorizations and is referenced no less than 29 times in this 28 page bill. Towards the end of the bill: "(e) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated to the Commission for fiscal year 2008 and each succeeding fiscal year $100,000,000 for payments under this section." This is an indefinite appropriation to keep the beast alive.

One of the broadened powers the bill extends to The Commission is to make it the "decider" of how precincts will be "randomly" selected for the so-called audits. ("the Election Auditor of the State shall administer the hand counts under this subtitle shall be made by the Election Auditor on an entirely random basis using a uniform distribution in which all precincts in a Congressional district have an equal chance of being selected, in accordance with procedures adopted by the Commission").

Another of the broadened powers the bill extends to our four white house appointees is to be the "decider" of which "expert" can observe voting system testing procedures. ("the laboratory certifies that it will permit an expert designated by the Commission to observe any testing the laboratory carries out under this section."

The Commission's definition of voting system is accepted as the authoritative definition.

The Commission's standards for voting systems are etched as THE MANDATED STANDARDS for all of the nation's voting systems.

In short, while the authors of HR 811 have removed any clear and explicit provision to extend the Commission, they reference the Commission no less than 29 times in the 28 page bill, granting it ever expanding powers in perpetuity.

HR811 references to The Commission are listed below.

1. p. 6 of 28: 'SEC. 247. STUDY AND REPORT ON ACCESSIBLE BALLOT VERIFICATION MECHANISMS. The Director of NIST (another nonrepresentational executively reporting agency) and the Commission will determine what voting systems research is funded to the tune of $3 MIL
2. p. 6 of 28: (3) CLARIFICATION OF ACCESSIBILITY STANDARDS UNDER VOLUNTARY VOTING SYSTEM GUIDANCE- In adopting any voluntary guidance under subtitle B of title III of the Help America Vote Act with respect to the accessibility of the paper ballot verification requirements for individuals with disabilities, the Election Assistance Commission shall include and apply the same accessibility standards applicable under the voluntary guidance adopted for accessible voting systems under such subtitle. The Commission's own defined accessibility standards are to be the norm for all voting systems in the nation.
3. p. 9 of 28: '(E) ELECTION-DEDICATED VOTING SYSTEM TECHNOLOGY DEFINED- For purposes of this paragraph, 'election-dedicated voting system technology' means 'voting system software' as defined under the 2005 voluntary voting system guidelines adopted by the Commission under section 222, but excludes 'commercial-off-the-shelf' software and hardware defined under those guidelines. The Commission is the official arbitor of defining "what is voting software:" - with COTS excluded - for all legal purposes.
4. p. 9 of 28: '(i) The manufacturer and the election officials shall document the secure chain of custody for the handling of all software, hardware, vote storage media, ballots, and voter-verified ballots used in connection with voting systems, and shall make the information available upon request to the Commission. The Commission is the custodian of information relating to chain of custody for voting equipment.
5. p. 10 of 28: '(iv) At the request of the Commission-- '(I) the appropriate election official shall submit information to the Commission regarding the State's compliance with this subparagraph; and '(II) the manufacturer shall submit information to the Commission regarding the manufacturer's compliance with this subparagraph. The Commission is the custodian of information relating to State and manufacturer chain of custody for voting equipment and software.
6. p. 10 of 28: '(C) DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLICATION OF BEST PRACTICES ON DOCUMENTATION OF SECURE CHAIN OF CUSTODY- Not later than August 1, 2008, the Commission shall develop and make publicly available best practices regarding the requirement of subparagraph (B)(i). The Commission is the arbiter of defining best practices concerning chain of custody for voting equipment and software.
7. p. 10 of 28: '(D) DISCLOSURE OF SECURE CHAIN OF CUSTODY- The Commission shall make information provided to the Commission under subparagraph (B)(i) available to any person upon request. The Commission is the information distributor regarding State chain of custody procedures.
8. p. 12 of 28: '(A) IN GENERAL- A laboratory may not be accredited by the Commission for purposes of this section unless-- The Commission has sole authority for accrediting voting equipment testing labs.
9. p. 12 of 28: '(ii) the laboratory meets such standards as the Commission shall establish (after notice and opportunity for public comment) to prevent the existence or appearance of any conflict of interest in the testing carried out by the laboratory under this section... The Commission establishes testing lab standards relating to conflicts of interest.
10. p. 12 of 28: '(iii) the laboratory certifies that it will permit an expert designated by the Commission to observe any testing the laboratory carries out under this section; The Commission designates the "expert" permitted to observe voting equipment testing
11. p. 12 of 28: '(iv) the laboratory, upon completion of any testing carried out under this section, discloses the test protocols, results, and all communication between the laboratory and the manufacturer to the Commission. The Commission is the recipient of all information relating to the testing of voting equipment.
12. p. 12 of 28: the Commission shall make the information available promptly to election officials and the public.The Commission is the public's conduit of information from voting equipment testing labs.
13. p. 12 of 28: '(A) ESTABLISHMENT OF ESCROW ACCOUNT- The Commission shall establish an escrow account (to be known as the 'Testing Escrow Account') for making payments to accredited laboratories for the costs of the testing carried out in connection with the certification, decertification, and recertification of voting system hardware and software. The Commission is, for the first time ever, granted authority to establish escrow accounts and enact payments to voting equipment test labs.
14. p. 13 of 28: '(B) SCHEDULE OF FEES- In consultation with the accredited laboratories, the Commission shall establish and regularly update a schedule of fees for the testing carried out in connection with the certification, decertification, and recertification of voting system hardware and software, based on the reasonable costs expected to be incurred by the accredited laboratories in carrying out the testing for various types of hardware and software. The Commission has authority to establish fee schedule for the testing of voting equipment.
15. p. 13 of 28: '(C) REQUESTS AND PAYMENTS BY MANUFACTURERS- A manufacturer of voting system hardware and software may not have the hardware or software tested by an accredited laboratory under this section unless-- '(i) the manufacturer submits a detailed request for the testing to the Commission; and '(ii) the manufacturer pays to the Commission, for deposit into the Testing Escrow Account established under subparagraph (A), the applicable fee under the schedule established and in effect under subparagraph (B). The Commission controls payment of fees to voting equipment test labs.
16. p. 13 of 28: '(D) SELECTION OF LABORATORY- Upon receiving a request for testing and the payment from a manufacturer required under subparagraph (C), the Commission shall select at random (to the greatest extent practicable), from all laboratories which are accredited under this section to carry out the specific testing requested by the manufacturer, an accredited laboratory to carry out the testing. The Commission determines which test lab tests which voting equipment.
17. p. 13 of 28: ACCREDITED LABORATORIES- '(A) INFORMATION ON TESTING- Upon completion of the testing of a voting system under this section, the Commission shall promptly disseminate to the public the identification of the laboratory which carried out the testing. The Commission is the public's conduit of information regarding test lab identification.
18. p. 13 of 28: '(B) INFORMATION ON STATUS OF LABORATORIES- The Commission shall promptly notify Congress, the chief State election official of each State, and the public whenever-- '(i) the Commission revokes, terminates, or suspends the accreditation of a laboratory under this section; '(ii) the Commission restores the accreditation of a laboratory under this section which has been revoked, terminated, or suspended; or '(iii) the Commission has credible evidence of significant security failure at an accredited laboratory.'. The Commission is the conduit for the public and Congress to information regarding any issues with test lab security failures and changes in certification status.
19. p. 14 of 28: (C) DEADLINE FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF STANDARDS, ESCROW ACCOUNT, AND SCHEDULE OF FEES- The Election Assistance Commission shall establish the standards described in section 231(b)(3) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 and the Testing Escrow Account and schedule of fees described in section 231(b)(4) of such Act (as added by subparagraph (A)) not later than January 1, 2008. The Commission has authority to establish standards for certifying and paying voting equipment test labs.
20. p. 14 of 28: (D) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS- There are authorized to be appropriated to the Election Assistance Commission such sums as may be necessary to carry out the Commission's duties under paragraphs (3) and (4) of section 231 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (as added by subparagraph (A)) The Commission is appropriated discretionary funds for dispersement to testing labs, which can be used to make appropriate or inappropriate payments to -- to support appropriate or inappropriate relationships with -- voting equipment test labs.
21. p. 14-15 of 28: (3) SPECIAL CERTIFICATION OF BALLOT DURABILITY AND READABILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR STATES NOT CURRENTLY USING DURABLE PAPER BALLOTS- (A) IN GENERAL- If any of the voting systems used in a State for the regularly scheduled 2006 general elections for Federal office did not require the use of or produce durable paper ballots, the State shall certify to the Election Assistance Commission not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act that the State will be in compliance with the requirements of sections 301(a)(2), 301(a)(12), and 301(b) of the Help America Vote of 2002, as added or amended by this subsection, in accordance with the deadline established under this Act, and shall include in the certification the methods by which the State will meet the requirements. The Commission is the authority to which the States must report to demonstrate compliance with the laws described by HR 811 and HAVA.
22. p. 17 of 28: '(f) Special Rule for Fiscal Year 2007- '(1) IN GENERAL- Notwithstanding any other provision of this part, a State is eligible to receive a requirements payment for fiscal year 2007 if, not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of the Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2007, the chief executive officer of the State, or designee, in consultation and coordination with the chief State election official-- '(A) certifies to the Commission the number of noncompliant and partially noncompliant precincts in the State (as defined in section 252(b)(2)); and '(B) files a statement with the Commission describing the State's need for the payment and how the State will use the payment to meet the requirements of title III (in accordance with the limitations applicable to the use of the payment under section 57(a)(4)). The Commission is the authority to which the States must report in order to receive payment for equipment replacement required by Section 2 of HR 811.
23. p. 23 of 28: 'SEC. 324. SELECTION OF PRECINCTS. '(a) In General- Except as provided in subsection (c), the selection of the precincts in the State in which the Election Auditor of the State shall administer the hand counts under this subtitle shall be made by the Election Auditor on an entirely random basis using a uniform distribution in which all precincts in a Congressional district have an equal chance of being selected, in accordance with procedures adopted by the Commission, except that at least one precinct shall be selected at random in each county. The Commission will establish procedures wherein States will select precincts for conducting audits.
24. p. 23 of 28: 'SEC. 325. PUBLICATION OF RESULTS. '(a) Submission to Commission- As soon as practicable after the completion of an audit under this subtitle, the Election Auditor of a State shall submit to the Commission the results of the audit, and shall include in the submission a comparison of the results of the election in the precinct as determined by the Election Auditor under the audit and the final unofficial vote count in the precinct as announced by the State and all undervotes, overvotes, blank ballots, and spoiled, voided or cancelled ballots, as well as a list of any discrepancies discovered between the initial, subsequent, and final hand counts administered by the Election Auditor and such final unofficial vote count and any explanation for such discrepancies, broken down by the categories of votes described in paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 323(a). The Commission is inserted into the process of States certifying their election results. The Commission is the authority to whom States must report audit results. Before certifying their election results, States must submit to the Commission detailed reports consisting of 14 data points as applied to at least four different categories of votes cast.
25. p. 24 of 28: '(b) Publication by Commission- Immediately after receiving the submission of the results of an audit from the Election Auditor of a State under subsection (a), the Commission shall publicly announce and publish the information contained in the submission. The Commission is the conduit to the public of information relating to state audits.
26. p. 24 of 28: '(c) Delay in Certification of Results by State- '(1) PROHIBITING CERTIFICATION UNTIL COMPLETION OF AUDITS- No State may certify the results of any election which is subject to an audit under this subtitle prior to-- '(A) to the completion of the audit (and, if required, any additional audit conducted under section 323(d)(1)) and the announcement and submission of the results of each such audit to the Commission for publication of the information required under this section; and '(B) the completion of any procedure established by the State pursuant to section 323(d)(2) to resolve discrepancies and ensure the accuracy of results. The Commission is inserted into the State procedures for certifying election results. No state can certify election results before meeting the Commission's requirements for reporting on HR811 mandated election audits.
27. p. 24 of 28: '(2) DEADLINE FOR COMPLETION OF AUDITS OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS- In the case of an election for electors for President and Vice President which is subject to an audit under this subtitle, the State shall complete the audits and announce and submit the results to the Commission for publication of the information required under this section in time for the State to certify the results of the election and provide for the final determination of any controversy or contest concerning the appointment of such electors prior to the deadline described in section 6 of title 3, United States Code. The Commission is inserted into the State procedures for certifying election results for President and Vice President. States must complete Commission required reports, no matter how onerous or time consuming, before certifying electors for President and Vice President.
28. p. 24 of 28: '(a) Payments For Costs of Conducting Audits- In accordance with the requirements and procedures of this section, the Commission shall make a payment to a State to cover the costs incurred by the State in carrying out this subtitle with respect to the elections that are the subject of the audits conducted under this subtitle. The Commission is the financial authority for appropriating payments to States to cover the cost of audits.
29. p. 25 of 28: '(e) Authorization of Appropriations- There are authorized to be appropriated to the Commission for fiscal year 2008 and each succeeding fiscal year $100,000,000 for payments under this section. The Commission is funded indefinitely with a budget more than six times its current levels, some of which to be used as payments to the States to cover the costs of conducting HR811 mandated audits.