Repairing HR 550

2006-09-03

HR 550, if passed as written, will establish a whole new arm of Executive power with dangerous authority to subvert the entire democratic process of elections that supports our system of government. It would result, in effect, in a bloodless coup.

HR 550: What’s Right about it, and What Needs to be Amended

The Holt bill has been called "the Gold Standard" by voting rights activists all over the country. It has been co-sponsored by leading political figures, and many voting activist groups are aggressively working towards the passage of this legislation. The bill holds promise and voting activists are excited about it because it talks about mandating paper trails for elections. Verifiable paper audit trails belong in any democratic election, and we should all applaud the bill's attempt to codify this.

However, since the drafting of HR 550 we have learned a lot about our election systems, and currently many election integrity activists oppose HR 550 as written for a number of reasons.

more below the fold

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HR 550 opponents rightfully assert that the bill would be strengthened by specifically defining real paper ballots as opposed to allowing for error-prone computer printouts as the vote of record. Printers jam, receipts are not ballots, and adding technology-based printing to the act of voting unnecessarily complicates what is a simple act. Many activists oppose the approach in HR 550 that supports "paper trails" that might be audited rather than real paper ballots that are – and not might be - counted.

Additionally, election activists raise questions about the audit protocols in the Holt Bill. Simon and O’Dell provide the following analysis of the audit protocols in HR 550:

Our key finding is that in a typical U.S. Congressional race a hand-count audit of 100% of the vote in a random 2% of the precincts would fail about 40% of the time to detect vote count corruption large enough to alter the outcome. This result is derived theoretically and confirmed by computer simulation. Even in those cases where HR 550 can detect a discrepancy, there will often be only a single precinct in which corruption is detected.

We question whether such a finding would be sufficient to trigger a recount, given a real world in which public perceptions have already been framed, and political pressures to accept the initial count are substantial. HR 550 offers no guidelines or criteria for a mandatory recount. Instead, the decision is left to a commission appointed by the President and inherently subject to partisan pressure.

Simon and O’Dell have developed a tested approach to auditing elections that eliminates theses pitfalls and could be incorporated into HR 550.
Another problematic feature of HR 550 is its support for centralized Executive power over the nation’s election systems. This, perhaps the most troubling, aspect is explored below.

HR 550 Enables Centralization of Executive Power

The democratic processes of the American Republic are based on decentralized power. Centralized power led to the American Revolution. Centralized power is the antithesis of a government of the people, by the people, and for the people. Provisions in HR 550 will lead to a dangerous centralization of Executive power, as described below.

  1. Centralization of Executive Power-White House Control over Counting the Votes: HR550 extends beyond the existing expiry date the power and authority of the Election Assistance Commission (EAC), establishing a Presidential Commission authorized to control the counting of votes in every election--federal, state, and local--in the nation.
  2. Centralization of Executive Power-Crony Appointments: The potential for stacking of the EAC is evident in the scenario already played out under the current Administration. In early 2006, the Bush White House made numerous recess appointments, putting political cronies into positions of power and authority without any Congressional oversight or checks and balances. Of the eight recess appointments made on January 4, 2006, three were Commissioner to the Federal Election Commission. Two of those appointed Commissioners are known for their opposition to voting rights and clean elections. The third is a political crony of Senate Minority Leader Reid of Nevada. (Nevada is now positioned to take a lead role in the Democratic presidential nomination process. For this privilege, Nevada has promised to play the nomination process by Party rules, financed by the Casino industry.)
  3. Centralization of Executive Power-Regulatory Authority: Federal regulatory authority means the federal entity preempts state and local authorities. The EAC was created as an advisory commission with one exception: it was granted regulatory authority over the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA). The EAC has been steadily positioning and even suing to assert its regulatory authority in other areas under its domain. Even if it does not succeed through litigation, the EAC could, with the insertion of a single line of text in ANY congressional act, become regulatory. This is how the FEC gained regulatory powers. A regulatory EAC means that a Presidential Commission-potentially stacked with political cronies-would have legal decision making and enforcement power over the following areas, for every state in the nation:
    • Which voting systems are approved for use in our elections
    • Who counts the votes in every election
    • How votes are counted in every election
    • How recounts are administered and how their outcomes are determined

A recent editorial in the New York Times, entitled "Strong Arming the Vote" (August 3, 2006) describes how the Department of Justice under the Bush Administration has been heavily involved in partisan ploys to negate necessary checks and balances in election practices. HR 550, if passed as written, will establish a whole new arm of Executive power with dangerous authority to subvert the entire democratic process of elections that supports our system of government.

It would result, in effect, in a bloodless coup.

How Can HR 550 Be Repaired?

An amended bill would gain nearly universal grassroots support.

An amended Holt Bill would remove those dangerous provisions that centralize Executive power and expand judicial election decision making authority. An amended Holt Bill will enable us to deal with the incontrovertible damage already caused by sweeping national legislation such as the Help America Vote Act (HAVA). An amended Holt Bill will support real paper ballots that can be observably counted, and properly audited when technology is used for vote tabulation. An amended Holt Bill will allow us to pause and reasonably assess where we are and what we need to do to repair the nation’s election systems so that they will be secure, transparent, accurate, and auditable.

A Holt Bill that amends HAVA and provides real solutions to the problems in our election system need only include three items:

  1. The incontrovertible and legally defensible system of verifiable elections through the use of real, voter-marked and verifiable paper ballots (as distinguished from paper trails)
  2. The elimination of secret vote counting through the use of black box voting products.
  3. An extension of all HAVA mandated deadlines pending a complete independent investigation, analysis, and audit of HAVA monies distributed and spent on electronic voting systems, the outcomes thereof, with said investigation including information on the most advanced system of checks and balances for elections: hand counted paper ballots.

Authors Bio:
Nancy Tobi is the author of numerous articles on election integrity, including "The Gifts of HAVA: Time to Ask for a Refund," "What's Wrong with the Holt Bill," and the newly released "We're Counting the Votes: An Election Preparedness Kit." She is co-founder and Chair of Democracy for New Hampshire, Chair of the Democracy for New Hampshire Fair Elections Committee, and a founding member of the Coordinating Council of the Election Defense Alliance. Her writings may be found at www.DemocracyForNewHampshire.com and www.ElectionDefenseAlliance.org, and she can be reached at ntobi@democracyfornewhampshire.com.

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Paper trail for election balloting

There is a very simple answer to having a verifiable paper trail for all voting in the State or any State.

The results would be controlled and verified under State control and not an outside contracted vendors machine.

Each polling station has a secured computer station, printer and scanner in a portable locked work station. As each voter enters they show eligibility to vote is verified,then a voting sheet(could be either legal or letter sized)is printed out and bears a sequenced number (sequenced for each voting/polling station for each county and district). The voter then goes into a stall and places the printed sheet into a frame with cut outs against each issue to be voted on. Then using either a special marking pen or soft pencil, they mark in the box as either YES or NO or leave blank.
Once the sheet is completed the voter then has the sheet scanned into the secured computer and a photocopy also made. The original is then folded up and placed in the ballot box. The voter then takes the photocopy with them (there can be a special marking across the photocopy for evidentury proof if a recount is needed and the voters requested for there numbered copy for cross reverification).

Very simple and fully controlled by each and every State/County and City....the technology is there.

Lets use the best minds in the industry here in New Hampshire to put this together (we have Oracle,E-copy,Compaq and many other computer/software companies who could step up to the plate). New Hampshire could set a precedent for all other States in the Union....'First again in the Nation'.

Regards,

Geoff Daly Carver North America Inc

Sounds expensive

On the other hand, we already have available the most advanced system of checks and balances for use in our elections: hand marked, hand cast, hand counted paper ballots.

Before even considering a high tech solution, such as that described above, I'd like to see a business analysis that supports it.

I propose that given the analysis, the business model would fail in all respects:

1) software development life cycles are lengthy in and of themselves without factoring in alpha testing, beta testing, and the subsequent required bug fixes following mass end user testing and usage.

A product of this nature, which is essentially a national security product, should not be released for use until it has undergone extensive testing beyond beta, since it is a ridiculous concept to use the elections of the United States of America as a test market. (although this is, sadly, the current state of affairs in the country.)

Irrespective of the necessary software development life cycle, elections must occur at their fixed dates every two years. The nature of the software development life cycle clearly does not fit within the required time frame.

2) software development is expensive, as is the hardware to support it. The target market for this product does not have the requisite resources to purchase, nevermind maintain, this product on an ongoing basis.

3) the costs and logistics involved in the manufacture, purchase, storage, and use of a system using so many high tech components as described above, far exceed what the average municipality, county, or state can afford, especially when considering that it will be used once every year or two and will require secure and environmentally sound storage during all the intervals between elections.

4) systems such as those described above require skillsets not typically found in the average election worker. The need for "experts" who come between the voters and the election system causes a fundamental breakdown in the right to observable elections, which is guaranteed to all NH citizens in our NH constitution.